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Building blocks for the macroeconomics and political economy of housing 
Housing played an essential part in the global financial crisis 2007-08 and the Euro 
crisis. Large parts of bank lending continue to go to mortgages. Housing wealth is the 
largest part of wealth for most households and is, at the same time, more dispersed than 
other forms of wealth. House prices exhibit pronounced fluctuations that are closely 
linked to credit growth. Housing thus plays a crucial role in the macroeconomy, which 
has become even more pronounced under neoliberalism. We scrutinise different 
theoretical approaches to housing. Despite its theoretical shortcomings, mainstream 
economics has pioneered empirical research on wealth effects in consumption and 
recently documented the role of house prices in financial cycles. Post-Keynesian theory 
emphasises endogenous money creation, cycles in asset prices and debt, and has 
formalised the notion of a debt-driven demand regime. Comparative Political Economy 
research has recently developed the concept of the varieties of residential capitalism, 
which has different structures of house ownership and housing finance at the core of 
political coalitions. Marxist political economy has long established the intrinsic link 
between ownership of land and economic rent and notes that homeownership can act as 
force of working class fragmentation. Wealth surveys can be used to trace the extent of 
conflicting interests in a class-relational approach. 
Keywords: housing, household debt, finance, real estate prices, class analysis 
 
Introduction 
Housing is an oddly under-researched topic in macroeconomics and political economy. This 
does not mean there is no research on housing. Quite on the contrary, there are subfields like 
real estate and housing economics or urban studies which have long paid close attention to 
issues of housing. But these constitute specialised fields. This may be changing as housing 
and mortgage finance have gained prominence after the 2008 crisis, where mortgages played 
a central role. However, in most baseline macroeconomic models, including the mainstream 
versions as well as the Post-Keynesian (PK) or Marxist versions, there is no housing market. 
This is surprising, given that housing accounts for 30-50% of a household’s expenditures, 
4 
 
around 90% of household debt, and residential investment constitutes approximately half of 
total investment. Similarly, in political economy, admittedly a heterogeneous field, there was 
until recently little systematic incorporation of housing. The extensive debates on class 
analysis, for instance, have sidestepped the issue of working class homeownership.  
In the global financial crisis (GFC) 2008 and the Euro crisis housing and housing finance, of 
course, have played a key role: real estate bubbles were a key factor for the booms that 
preceded the crisis, derivatives on mortgages and, in particular, subprime mortgage securities 
were at the epicentre of the early stages of the crisis and their price collapse drove hedge 
funds into bankruptcy ultimately paralysing the shadow banking sector and, eventually, the 
entire financial system. While in Europe the subprime securitization featured less 
prominently, the house price booms and busts in Ireland and Spain were severe. In Britain the 
bankruptcy of Northern Rock was due to its aggressive growth, mostly in mortgages. Thus 
since the crisis 2008 there has been a strong growth in interest in the role of housing and 
housing finance, and a reconsideration of the how financial systems operate more generally.  
The GFC has led to dynamically growing analyses of the various impacts of housing and 
housing finance ranging from historical analyses of the composition of credit (Jordà, 
Schularick, and Taylor 2016), the impact of housing wealth vs financial wealth on 
consumption expenditures, the impact of housing vs business credit on growth (Bezemer 
2014; Bezemer, Grydaki, and Zhang 2016), analyses of the drivers of household debt 
(Stockhammer and Wildauer 2016) and housing in political economy (Aalbers and 
Christophers 2014a). 
This paper surveys a rapidly growing literature in the field of macroeconomics and political 
economy of housing and housing finance. The aim of the paper is, first, to review the 
literature on the impact of housing, mortgages and real estate prices on macroeconomic 
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growth and stability and to assess to what extent different economic paradigms can account 
for the stylized facts. Second, we review the literature on the impact of housing structures on 
political attitudes and class structures and assess how different approaches can explain these.  
Third, we apply a class-based analysis to the UK wealth and asset survey with the aim to 
delineate a future empirical research agenda combing political economy and macroeconomic 
approaches. 
Our review suggests the following stylized facts that different theories have to explain: 
mortgages are the largest components of household debt. Real estate prices reveal both 
increases over the last decades and a cyclical pattern, with a cycle length well beyond regular 
business cycles. Changes in household debt have become an important driver of growth and 
the level of household debt is a predictor of the severity of recessions. Periods of rising house 
prices often do not come with a spread homeownership implying that the increase in house 
prices will have distributional effects. There is some evidence that homeownership impacts 
on political attitudes, in particular regarding the welfare state. Homeownership is strongly 
related to income distribution. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses analyses of housing and housing 
finance from economic and financial history. Sections 3 and 4 surveys the contributions of 
mainstream economics and post-Keynesian theory on the topic. Section 5 reviews models of 
house price cycles. Section 6 and 7 cover Comparative and Marxist Political Economy 
respectively. Section 8 discusses the housing in the UK from a class-analytic perspective. 




Economic and financial history 
While economic history has long-standing concern for corporate finance, in particular the 
finance of industrialisation most financial histories do not cover housing finance. 
Kindleberger’s (1993) seminal Financial History of Western Europe has several index entries 
for mortgages, but these refer mostly to agricultural mortgages rather than household credit. 
Similarly, in one of the early books on financialisation, Arrighi (1994) takes a long historical 
view, where financialisation features in the long downswing of the hegemonic power losing 
industrial leadership but maintaining financial dominance. He discusses industrial finance 
and government debt, but not household debt or mortgages. 
It is only very recently that more systematic histories of housing and housing finance have 
been written. These point to at least three important shifts in housing finance and house price 
dynamics, which need to be explained by macroeconomic and political economy theories. 
Firstly, Blackwell and Kohl (2018) and Kohl (2018) give an overview of the history of 
mortgage credit institutions. These differ in important ways from the banks that deal with 
businesses. In particular the market/bank-based distinction does not apply in this form to 
mortgages. The Scandinavian and Germanic countries developed forms of mortgage 
securitisation that allowed specialised institutions to emerge that sold on mortgages in the 
form of covered bonds, i.e. they remained on the banks’ balance sheets. Jorda et al (2016) 
document the secular increase in mortgage lending as share of bank balance sheets. They 
report declining share of mortgages as share of total bank lending until the World War I, an 
increasing share in the interwar period that consequently collapses, and then sustained rise of 
mortgage credit after World War II, which accelerates after 1980. While in 1900 around one 
third of loans were non-mortgages, by 2000 the share was two thirds (Jorda et al 2016, Figure 
4). Knoll, Schularick, and Steger (2017) present data on real house prices, which show that, 
fluctuation notwithstanding, real house prices were relatively stable until World War II and 
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begin a secular increase (with larger fluctuations) since then. The following sections review 
the ability of different approaches to macroeconomics and political economy to account for 
both the emergence of these trends and their effects. 
Mainstream macroeconomics  
Mainstream macroeconomics has lacked a systematic treatment of debt and assets. At the 
core this is related to strong role of assumptions of rationality and life cycle optimisation 
behaviour. This is has ruled out interest in speculative asset prices movement and often in a 
separation of the discussion of financial and ‘real’ issues. Real issues are about technology 
shocks, which give the impetus for real business cycle theory (RBC) and are still at the core 
of modern DSGE model, which are essentially RBC models with nominal rigidities. The 
assumption of rationality and perfect foresight also ruled out an analysis bankruptcies.  
In the background of these models is a loanable funds theory of financial markets, where 
lending is understood as a use of saving and saving a (positive) function of the interest rate. 
This is at odds with Keynesian understanding (saving depending on income) and modern 
theories of endogenous money creation (where loans create deposits). It also focuses on net 
lending and tends to regard households as the surplus (saving) unit and firms as the deficit 
(borrowing unit). In fact, the lending boom of the 2000s was driven by household borrowing 
(and financial sector borrowing) and was gross lending. 
The neoclassical literature on housing is theoretically uninteresting. Housing is seen as a 
‘standard commodity’ (Fallis 1985, 34), the demand for which is determined by relative 
prices of other goods and households’ budget constraint stemming from their labour-leisure 
trade-off. The supply of housing follows a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, land 
being one among other capital inputs and paid at its marginal product. Investment decisions 
then, reflect producers’ time discount rate (equal to the market rate of interest) and price is 
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determined by the forces of demand and supply (Fallis 1985).  
Mainstream macroeconomics is divided into New Classical and New Keynesian streams. The 
New Keynesian approach accepts the need for microfoundations based on optimising 
behaviour, but questions whether markets are always clearing given market imperfections 
like transaction costs or asymmetric information. That gave rise to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
model of credit rationing, which is still a benchmark model and informs the financial 
accelerator model (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999). The Stiglitz model, notably, is a 
model of rationing credit to businesses, i.e. it is about corporate credit, not mortgages. The 
financial accelerator model and the related lending channel literature emphasise that net 
worth will affect the value of collateral and thus access to credit. Therefore banks will want 
to restrict lending if they have balance sheet problems. In the New Keynesian setting (i.e. 
with information asymmetries), credit constraints matter for macroeconomic outcomes. In an 
NK DSGE model with two types of households that differ by their rate of time preference 
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) show that episodes of what they refer to a ‘Minsky Koo debt 
deflation’ can arise, but the model neither has a proper financial sector nor are financial crises 
endogenous. 
However, despite the theoretical limitations of the mainstream models, mainstream policy 
institutions did generate a substantial amount of empirically or policy-driven research. In 
particular central banks and the OECD were leading the empirical literature on wealth effects 
(Boone, Giorno, and Richardson 1998; IMF 2000). This literature was motivated in the 1990s 
by the declining saving rate of US households, which from a neoclassical perspective would 
depress long-run growth (Maki and Palumbo 2001). In the 1990s, however, it came with 
relatively high levels of growth. A sizable literature emerged that highlighted the role of 
increasing wealth as a cause of increasing consumption. Initially, the focus was on financial 
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wealth and equity prices in particular, as the 1990s were a period of sustained equity price 
inflation, which eventually ended in the dot.com crash of 2000. However, while equity prices 
collapsed in 2000 and remained subdued thereafter, consumption expenditures held up, which 
lead to the realisation that housing wealth is typically (at least in the Anglo-Saxon countries) 
more important for consumption as homeownership is widespread and real estate is good 
collateral (Case, Shiller, and Quigley 2005; Slacalek 2009).  
That said, the empirical literature on wealth effects fits somewhat uneasily within the rational 
foresight model, which is reflected in that literature. First, it is not clear whether housing 
wealth in such a model is wealth at all (Buiter 2010). Second, there is a tension between 
theory and the empirical approach in these papers. In their theory sections the empirical 
wealth effects papers refer to rational actor/perfect foresight models and then estimate 
consumption equations that react to market prices. In other words, perfectly rational 
individuals in, say, Ireland, observe a sharp increase in real estate prices and act on it as if it 
were a fundamental increase in real estate values, i.e. the perfectly rational individuals never 
worry about the possibility of a bubble even in the face of spectacular price increases.  
Especially after the crisis there was an assessment of the impact of real estate prices on credit 
availability. Among the most impressive of these is a series of papers by Mian and Sufi who 
use fine-grained survey data to document how the decline in house prices affected US 
households across regions (Mian, Rao, and Sufi 2013) and argue that credit supply shocks 
explain much of the housing bubble (Mian and Sufi 2018). Several authors at the critical edge 
of the New Keynesian mainstream have made the case that lending and house prices can 
reinforce each other to give rise to bubbles (Muellbauer 2007; Goodhart and Hofmann 2008), 
however without turning this into a full theory of endogenous cycles. 
Since the crisis, it is fair to say, this critical research on financial instability and the long-term 
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growth impact of finance has turned into sizeable stream, even if it presses ahead without 
adequate theory. Aizenman and Jinjarak (2014) provide evidence that capital flows have a 
powerful effect on real estate prices (see also: Badarinza and Ramadorai 2018). Arcand et al 
(2015) provide evidence that finance has negative effects on growth beyond a certain 
threshold, namely when private debt reaches 100% of GDP. This represents a major 
departure from the dominant view that financial deepening has a positive impact on growth 
(Levine 1997). Borio (2012) and Barrell et al. (2010) document that house price inflation is a 
leading indicator for financial crises. Drehman, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2012) and Aikman, 
Haldane, and Nelson (2015) provide evidence for the existence of financial cycles, which is 
inconsistent with the notion that financial crises are due to exogenous shocks. These financial 
cycles are longer than regular business cycles. 
What emerges from this brief survey of mainstream economics is a tension between a 
theoretical framework that, with its rationality and market clearing assumptions, is ill-suited 
to explain recent dynamics and crises emanating from the real estate sector, and at the same 




Post Keynesian economics (PKE) does not employ the life time optimising assumptions of 
neoclassical economics. Rather it assumes given marginal propensities of consumption that 
will differ by class position or by the position within the income distribution. To some extent 
PKE has suffered from the relatively independent advancement of its Kaleckian and 
Minskyan stream. As the basic Keynesian model assumes autonomous consumption, this 
implies that if there are demand shocks, of which there are plenty in a Keynesian economy, 
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parts of the population (presumably the poor or those with illiquid assets) will have to 
accumulate debt in order to accommodate to the resulting income declines while autonomous 
consumption stays constant. Despite the fact that there is a logical role for household 
borrowing in PKE, it has not traditionally played an important role. Nor has housing. The 
PKE class model seems to implicitly have been interpreted as one where workers not only do 
not have property in the means of production, but also none in the means of reproduction, 
which includes housing. We will return to this issue in section 8. Wealth effects do not 
feature prominently in PKE (until the development of SFC models) as they were historically 
associated with the neoclassical and Monetarist criticisms of Keynesianism. 
There are five debates where household debt and, ultimately, housing does enter. First, Palley 
(1994) and Dutt (2006) proposed models of working class household debt. The poor are 
borrowing from the rich, which will have positive short-term effects on consumption (as 
finance is made available to those with high marginal consumption propensities), but 
negative longer term effects as interest payments distribute income towards those with high 
savings propensities. These models are focussed on consumer debt and do not treat housing 
explicitly. Second, an important innovation in PKE has been the development of stock flow 
consistent (SFC) models. These track all flows and stocks in a macroeconomic model and 
enforce consistency between the two. In these models economic sectors are thought of in a 
balance sheet context and assets and liabilities will enter behavioural equations. Godley and 
Tobin have pioneered these models and Godley has repeatedly highlighted that economies are 
anchored in stock-flow norms. If one assumes that consumption depends on disposable 
income and some measure of wealth, this implies that households will attempt to reach a 
target wealth-to-income ratio (Godley and Lavoie 2007, 75). If wealth increases beyond the 
target ratio, households will consume that ‘excess wealth’. As housing wealth is the most 
important wealth component for households, borrowing in order to realize real estate capital 
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gains would be the result. Indeed, Godley (1999) had warned early that rising US household 
debt would be unsustainable. Third, in the demand regimes literature, which began as an 
operationalisation of the Bhaduri-Marglin framework, there was a recognition that some of 
the actual neoliberal growth models were relying heavily on the growth of household debt, 
which fuelled consumption growth (Stockhammer 2012; Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013). 
While some authors suggest that rising income inequality has been the main driver of 
household debt (Kapeller and Schütz 2014; Perugini, Hölscher, and Collie 2016), 
Stockhammer and Wildauer (2016) present evidence that real estate prices are the main 
cause. Fourth, while Minsky (1978) focussed on business debt rather than household debt, the 
notion of endogenous financial instability has also been applied to the household sector. Ryoo 
(2016) presents model of housing cycles that is driven by non-linear expectation of house 
price inflation (such as in Dieci and Westerhoff 2012). Fifth, with close reference to the 
financialisation debates (see below), several authors have suggested that increased lending in 
the neoliberal era would result in higher volatility rather than higher growth. Bezemer et al. 
(2016) analyse lending decisions of banks and highlight the distinction between nonfinancial 
credit and asset market credit. Real estate transactions are an example for the latter (but it 
also includes credit to financial institutions). Bezemer et al. (2016) argue that the two types of 
credit have different demand and growth effects. Arestis and González (2014) is one of the 
few PK papers that explicitly model the housing sector in a macro model. They propose a 
model of the supply and demand for housing based on PK endogenous money theory. The 
model allows for private sector borrowing derived from real estate transactions, however it 
does not explicitly model business and household borrowing decisions separately.  
We found that PKE with it basis in conventional behaviour and pro-cyclical animal spirits 
and its theory of endogenous money creation is better equipped to analyse financial cycles 
and crisis, but it has been slow to apply this framework to housing. There are several 
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noteworthy rigorous empirical studies on debt-driven growth models and the differential 
impact of business credit and mortgage and financial credit, but overall PKE has not 
translated into an empirical research programme on housing. 
 
Models of house price cycles 
Overall it is surprising how few macroeconomic models of house price cycles there are. 
There is strong evidence of financial cycles (Drehmann et al 2012; Aikman et al 2015), which 
typically find that house prices are a key component of these cycles. Glaeser (2013) 
documents the long history of real estate speculation in the USA. House price inflation also 
performs well in tests of early warning systems for financial crises (Barrell et al. 2010). The 
positive feedback loop between house prices and credit is well established (e.g. Arestis and 
González 2014). But still, given that most macro models fail to include the housing sector, 
even fewer model house price cycles, with some exceptions that are grounded in PKE, 
behavioural economics or heterogeneous agents modelling. Dieci and Westerhoff (2012) 
present a model of the housing market where endogenous price cycles emerge from the 
interaction of actors with fundamentalist and those with momentum-based expectations, 
however, they do not offer a full macroeconomic model. On the PKE side, Ryoo (2016) 
presents a model where household form extrapolative expectations about house price 
increases and use increased borrowing to finance consumption, which drives the boom. 
Assuming a non-linear expectation function eventually the bubble bursts. Bofinger et al. 
(2013) extend a NK DSGE model with a monetary policy rule to include a housing market. 
They build on De Grauwe (2012) who had introduced fundamentalists momentum trader 
dynamics in a full macro model with heuristics and learning. Bofinger el at apply this to the 




While house price cycles can be modelled, changing trends over time such as the increase in 
mortgages as share of bank lending or increases in the frequency and magnitude of house 
price fluctuations observed by economic historians (see section 2) call for an incorporation of 
political and institutional factors. This bridge is offered by political economy approaches. The 
next two sections review Comparative Political Economy (CPE) and Marxist political 
economy approaches to housing respectively.  
 
Comparative Political Economy and the financialisation debates 
Comparative Political Economy (CPE) is an emerging field that is informed both by 
economics, in particular the classical school and Keynesian traditions, and by social sciences, 
in particular political science (Clift 2014). Finance and housing have not featured centrally in 
this field until recently.  
Within CPE the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) has been particularly influential because it 
managed to integrate previous insights in the differences in labour relations, welfare systems 
and financial systems. It emphasises substantial differences in national capitalisms. The 
central reference point in establishing those varieties of capitalism is how they achieve 
competitiveness. The most famous distinction of VoC is between liberal and coordinated 
market economies. The focus on competitiveness has implied a focus on corporate finance (as 
opposed to housing finance) and a functionalism (the financial sector is analysed as providing 
finance for business rather than being the origin as financial crises). The widely used 
distinction within financial systems between market and bank based systems stems from the 
analysis of corporate finance. 
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Some of the CPE literature does not adhere to the VoC framework and gets closer to PK 
growth models, showing that credit growth sustains demand regimes and welfare provision 
increasingly relies on housing and housing finance. Crouch (2009) has coined the term 
‘privatized Keynesianism’, arguing that original Keynesianism relied on government 
intervention and thus public debt to stabilise the economy and consumers’ expectations. This 
has since the 1980s been replaced by a regime, where credit is provided to household by 
commercial banks and other lenders. Crouch cites rising levels of mortgage debt as evidence 
and argues that in some countries, namely the UK, this turned into an effective policy regime, 
but he does not offer a systematic comparative analysis. Crouch does not discuss the fact that 
private lending tends to be pro-cyclical (in contrast to Keynesian deficit spending, which is 
counter-cyclical) but highlights that “financial firms and entrepreneurs developed forms of 
knowledge that encouraged eventually self-destructive decisions” (Crouch 2009, 393). 
Watson (2010) makes a similar argument and uses the term ‘house price Keynesianism’, 
which (again for the UK) he situates it in the context of a move towards asset based welfare. 
Watson (2010) analyses the impact of house prices and mortgage debt on the subjectivity and 
identity of households and also highlights the cyclical nature of house prices.  
Parts of the CPE literature emphasise political implications of homeownership. Schwartz and 
Seabrooke (2008) propose a theory of varieties of residential capitalism. Unlike the original 
VoC approach competitiveness is not a reference point in their analysis (presumably because 
the national housing markets do not compete internationally). Rather they offer a rich 
classification of the political economy of homeownership and housing finance. Based on the 
systems of housing finance and homeownership rates, they distinguish between corporatist 
(high mortgage debt and low ownership; Germany, Netherland, Denmark), liberal (high 
mortgage rates and high ownership; UK, USA, Australia, Norway), statist developmentalist 
(low mortgage and low ownership; Austria, France, Japan, Sweden) and catholic-familial 
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(low mortgage and high ownership; Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Spain). They emphasise the 
political economy implication of these regimes: home ownership tends to undermine the 
viability of large welfare states, in particular public pension systems (the requirement of high 
down payment conflicts with the ability to pay higher taxes); high ownership rates will make 
it more difficult to find majorities to pass rent control laws and provide public housing. This 
is confirmed by Ansell (2014), who based on US and UK survey data finds econometric 
evidence that homeownership in the presence of house price appreciation is negatively 
correlated to individual preferences for redistribution and social insurance systems. Yet, 
Schwartz and Seabrooke’s analysis is static in describing the interaction of housing structures 
and political majorities as well as some institutional complementarities. In contrast, financial 
crises or house prices cycles do not feature. 
Blackwell and Kohl (2018) provide a history of housing finance. They offer a classification 
based on the distinction a deposit- based bank system, a mortgage bond-based bank system, 
state-based and a peer-based lending system. They provide historical evidence and a 
historical explanation, which extends Gerschenkron’s theory of late industrialisers, but with 
quite different results. In particular they argue that some patterns of corporate finance are 
inverted for housing finance. The early industrialisers developed deposit-based mortgages, 
i.e. a form of bank-based systems. In contrast, late comers like Scandinavian and Germanic 
countries developed a form of mortgage finance that is more market-based in that it relies on 
mortgage securitization. Extreme late-comers typically relied on state-based systems. Kohl 
(2018) argues that higher mortgages do not necessarily lead to higher homeownership rates 
based on a historical review since the late 19th century and econometric analysis for the post-
war period. Thus mortgage growth is neither necessary nor sufficient for homeownership. 
Kohl, more than the other CPE literature speaks directly to the cyclical nature of house prices 
and the house price-mortgage debt loop. 
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In the financialisation debates, issues of housing come relatively late, that is in the 1990s. 
Initial debates on financialisation focussed on financial liberalisation, in particular in 
developing economies, and on corporate governance and shareholder value orientation, i.e. 
the financialisation of businesses rather than households. These emphasised the potentially 
negative effects of financialisation on growth and the business cycle and its distributional 
implications. However, by the late 1990s and early 2000s the financialisation of households 
and the rise of household debt featured more prominently. Langley (2007) highlights the 
changing subjectivities stemming from the increased financial involvement of households. 
These include in particular the rise of mortgages and private pension provision. Erturk and 
Solari (2007) highlighted the shift in bank balance sheet from lending to businesses towards 
lending to households, i.e. mortgages, and fee generating activities (i.e. investment banking 
activities). Changing historical trends in housing markets observed by economic historians 
(see section 2) are thus located in the wider phenomenon of financialistion by this stream of 
literature.  
Much like in macroeconomics, housing has been a side issue until recently. In the last few 
years research on housing has left the VoC framework behind and investigated the political 
impact of homeownership, in particular on attitudes towards the welfare state and the pension 
systems and borrowed from Keynesian analyses of debt. A core tenet of CPE rests on the 
two-way relationship between housing and policy regimes: housing and housing finance 
systems are shaped by policy regimes and policy regimes are themselves influenced if not 
reducible to housing interests. While there are several useful contributions a unified CPE 




Marxist Political Economy 
Marxist political economy approaches the question how and to what extent housing has 
restructured systemic dynamics of accumulation through conflicting interest around 
ownership of land and real estate and the mediation of these conflicts through the state and 
through the market. As for the other schools of thought it is striking that housing appears in 
niche debates rather than constituting an integral part of their core theory (such as Shaikh 
2016). The theorisation of social relations of land-ownership builds on the concept of land 
rents and power of land-/ property-owners to extract payment from non-owners (Aalbers and 
Christophers 2014a; Aalbers and Christophers 2014b; Berry 2014). Debates over the origin of 
land rent in the urban context are theoretically unsettled (Harvey 1974; Park 2014; Basu 
2018). Yet, there are a number of points of agreement, in particular the collective nature 
underlying increases in land values, the value of land being enhanced, for instance, by public 
spending on infrastructure, or ultimately collective processes like the emergence of 
production agglomerations or urbanisation processes more widely (Harvey 1974).  
The conceptualisation of housing around rent allows for two things. Firstly, it establishes 
contradictions of wealth accumulation based on rent appropriation. Rent is a benefit derived 
from the exclusive possession of a factor of production in excess of the production cost of 
that factor, and is therefore an unearned windfall income to be distinguished from productive 
activity and profits (Ryan-Collins, Lloyd, and MacFarlane 2017). The value of land not being 
directly related to investment the owner of land has put in the land but, instead, determined 
socially, makes ownership over this scarce if man-made asset a means of rent extraction. If 
hardly proposing a new insight, Marxists are more explicit about the fact that housing and 
land cannot form a long-term basis for wealth accumulation. For value to be appropriated it 
has to be created somewhere and “If all capital chases rent and no capital goes into 
production, then no value will be produced out of which the transfer payment that rent 
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represents can come.” (Harvey 1974, 241) In the Marxist reading, for capital gains to be 
realised on land and real estate, prices of land and real estate have to rise faster than the 
general price level. Since rising house prices will eventually be passed down into rents, rents 
paid by tenants will rise faster than inflation and wages (Berry 1986; Edel 1982).  Increases 
in disposable income outright owners enjoy in the absence of rent payments rely on the same 
conditions. This, in turn, implies limits to property-based wealth accumulation and wealth 
effects. 
Secondly, it allows establishing class-interests opposed to one another. Ownership of housing 
and real estate can be related to the appearance of conflicting housing-related interests, which 
cross-cut basic class divisions. Classes in the orthodox Marxist reading are understood as 
antagonistic interests between workers and capitalists, other struggles being contained within 
and organised around these boundaries. The concrete manifestations of interests, class tactics 
and alliances cannot, however, be mechanically derived from these two abstract categories 
but will depend on particular historical conjunctures expressed politically and ideologically 
(Poulantzas 1982). An important element in tracing the concrete manifestations of interests 
and potentially alliances with sections of other classes is the process of class fragmentation. 
Class fragmentation can have different origins, but a limited number of contributions identify 
housing as an important driver of working class fragmentation (Berry 1986; Harvey 1982). 
While Saunders (1984) treats housing-related interests as undermining the usefulness of the 
capital labour divide, Berry points out that access to owner-occupation is income determined 
and therefore itself determined by labour market outcomes. When fragmentation occurs 
within classes this can generate significant income inequalities within classes and lead to 
overlap in income levels across class boundaries. This does not necessarily mean that 
common interests transcending traditional class boundaries form, but there is likely going to 
be intra-class conflict to protect and extend these income shares. Therefore, the promotion of 
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property ownership among workers ultimately serves capitalists in that it establishes workers’ 
allegiance with the principle of private property (Harvey 1982) and that it can drive 
homeowners to defend their privileged position in the workplace against the interests of other 
workers (Berry 1986).  
Harvey (1974) locates housing-related class interests in conflicting interests between 
landlords and low-income tenants as well as between speculator-developers and middle 
classes. He emphasises that the balance of power between these different classes needs to be 
examined together with supportive political institutions. The state, following multiple sets of 
logic often at the same time, plays a crucial role in creating, recreating, changing and 
restricting development of housing markets thereby tipping the balance of power between 
different housing related interest groups.  
Both CPE and Marxist political economy provide important bridges to other social sciences 
that help account for institutional and political factors behind observed correlations between 
housing and macroeconomic aggregates and changes to trends over time. CPE has been 
successful in establishing patterns from a comparative perspective, documenting the 
complementarity of homeownership and welfare regimes, and elaborating political aspects of 
debt-driven growth models. A distinctive feature of Marxist approaches is that they regard 
social outcomes as shaped by class structures and conflict based in production relations. 
Homeownership thus represents a fragmentation of the working class, which impacts on its 
bargaining position. However, Marxists have been slow to take this class- and rents-based 





Exploring housing in a class-relational approach based on wealth survey – an 
illustration from the UK 
To illustrate the relevance of these points (i.e. contradiction of rent-based accumulation and 
conflicting housing-related interests) but also the challenges in taking these points forward 
empirically, we briefly turn to the example of the UK. Here, several housing-related policy 
shifts have promoted real estate as a means of wealth accumulation, investment opportunity 
and insurance against dwindling wages, pensions and welfare provision. These policy shifts 
had a substantial impact on macroeconomic outcomes including household debt, house prices 
and financial instability (Fernandez and Aalbers 2017). Yet, they also contributed to the 
appearance of conflicting housing-related interests, which cross-cut basic class divisions and 
changed the accumulation dynamics among firms. 
Firstly, from the early 1980s onwards UK housing policy shifted away from subsidies for the 
supply-side through state sponsored housing development towards demand-side incentives 
with the aim of helping individuals to either buy or rent (Ryan-Collins, Lloyd, and 
MacFarlane 2017). Secondly, since the late 1970s around half of the UK’s public estate was 
privatised, equivalent to 10% of British land mass (Christophers 2018). Finally, financial 
deregulation was a significant counterpart of the Thatcher government’s promotion of 
demand for owner-occupied housing as a means to widen access to private mortgage finance 
(Wood 2017; Hasan and Taghavi 2002).  
These policy shifts have strengthened class interests emphasised by Harvey 1974, in 
particular those of speculator developers tied to finance capital and those of landlords more 
generally. They favoured monopolisation and speculation in the developer market, smaller 
developers being driven out of the market since social house building did no longer act as 
counter-cyclical force to the business cycle. The release of public land, in turn, served larger 
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developers to engage in speculative land banking (Christophers 2018). The growth in the 
supply of houses reduced substantially, annual housing completion being less than half their 
peak in 1968 by 2013. This, coupled with increased demand acted as a driver of substantial 
house price increases in the UK since the late 1980s (Ryan-Collins, Lloyd, and MacFarlane 
2017). Private landlordism increased since the 1990s and intensified after the GFC (Kemp 
2015) becoming, in fact, a wealth accumulation strategy (Soaita et al. 2017).  
The housing related policy shifts are also likely to have contributed to working class 
fragmentation into non-property-owning-working class and property-owning-working class 
as theorised by Berry (1986). Based on the first five waves of the UK Wealth and Asset 
survey (WAS) (Office For National Statistics 2018), Arundel (2017) has empirically 
established housing as the major driver of wealth inequality in the UK. The WAS can be 
taken further to trace inequalities specifically in a class-relational approach treating them as 
coming out of antagonistic interests between and within classes, mirroring an approach 
pioneered by Fessler and Schürz (2018). This can serve as a starting point to map the 
potential importance of antagonistic housing-related interests within classes.  
Fessler and Schürz (2018) distinguish between renters, owners and capitalists. They maintain 
that these ownership structures imply unequal power relationships between classes and drive 
inequality, with a very clear concentration of renters in the first three deciles of the income 
distribution, a concentration of owners between the fourth and eighth decile and a 
concentration of capitalists among the two wealthiest deciles both in the US and in the 
Euroarea.  
However, different ways to delineate intra-class fragmentation and conflict are possible. In 
what follows, we define housing-related class fragmentation as antagonistic interests between 
renters, outright owners, mortgage owners and rentiers, including the latter to account for the 
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Marxist emphasis on rents emanating from housing. Renters are all those who report to rent 
their main residence.1 Outright owners are those who report to own their main residence 
without mortgage and do not derive any rental income. Mortgage owners are those who 
report to own their main residence with mortgage but do not derive any rental income from 
other property. Rentiers own their main residence with or without mortgage and also own 
other land or real estate such as buy to let properties from which they derive rental income.  
Owner-occupiers have an interest in increasing house prices to realise capital gains on their 
property wealth. Yet, property values being loosely correlated to rent prices, this is 
diametrically opposed to the interests of renters. Politically, this could play out in opposing 
interests around new housing development. Though not explicitly pursuing a Marxist class-
relational approach, Coelho et al (2017), trace political conflict between homeowners and 
voters with interests in social housing. Vested interests of existing home-owners for prices 
increases influence planning decisions, the housing stock growing significantly less in local 
authorities with higher proportions of owner-occupiers among local households.  
Mortgage owners, have, in principle similar interests to those of outright owners though their 
behaviour in the workplace might be very different. Mortgage owners depend on bank 
finance and are, in the face of rising house prices, heavily dependent on keeping their 
employment and also to remain in high-paid positions (Kim, Tadeu Lima, and Setterfield 
2017). Harvey (1982) sees this as the ultimate way to discipline workers’ militancy. They are 
thus likely to be ready to defend their privileged position in the workplace, possibly against 
                                                 
1 There were 111 cases, in which the primary residence was rented but rental income derived. For 82 
of these rental incomes derive from BTL or land overseas or other property and they were 
classified 'rentier'. The remaining 29 cases did not own property of any sort nor have mortgages, 
some even deriving benefits. Their rental income might derive from peer-to-peer renting 
schemes. They were classified as renters.  
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the interests of non-property owning workers. The outright-owning working class, by 
contrast, is to an extent de-commodified by housing wealth, notably through the higher 
disposable income they enjoy in the absence of rent payments. Finally, rentiers, rely for a part 
of their income on rental income. They therefore have an active interest for there to be a pool 
of (low-income) tenants with no alternative to private-renting. This is likely to be mirrored in 
an opposition to social housing but could also be expressed in support for precarious forms of 
employment like zero-hour contracts.  
Table 1 summarises the proportions of these different tenure classes within the sample. The 
WAS (Office For National Statistics 2018) surveyed 18,611 households, which with 
appropriate weights add up to 25.6 million households, hence representing the total number 
of households in the UK. Of these, 32.7% are renters. Outright owners and mortgage owners 
account for roughly 30% of households each. Finally, there are a non-negligible number of 
UK households who derive rental income from property, in total 1.6 million households, i.e. 
6.4% of households.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
It is noteworthy, that mortgage owners and rentiers are overrepresented in managerial and 
professional occupations. This particularly pronounced for rentiers, 62% of which report to 
pursue managerial occupations. By contrast, Renters are overrepresented in routine and 
manual occupations (50%) though roughly one third of outright owners also report to pursue 
or have pursued this type of profession (Table A1 in the Appendix). Yet, 88% of outright 
owners are older than 55. By contrast, 65% of renters, 81% of mortgage owners and 52% of 
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rentiers are younger than 55 (Table A2).  
We find substantial differences in total annual household income, employment income and 
pensions between the different housing statuses, mean income being lowest among renters 
(£23,465), followed by outright owners (£32,214). The highest average annual incomes 
emerge among the rentiers (£63,479). Note that while these differences are driven by labour 
market outcomes (employment income of rentiers for instance being nearly twice that of 
outright owners and around three times that of renters when excluding pensioners), income 
from rent accounts for substantial parts of income of rentiers. Average annual rental incomes 
of rentiers (£13,061) are in the same order of magnitude as renters’ average employee 
incomes (£12,861) (Table 2). Rental incomes represent 41% rentiers’ of employee incomes 
(31% when excluding pensioners) and 21% of their total average annual income. Notice that 
these rental incomes largely exceed any income derived from investment, rental incomes 
being around four times higher than investment income (calculations based on Table 2). In 
short, there appears to be a group of high income earners who actively play the housing 
market and derive substantial parts of their total income from rental payments. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
This allows for three observations. Firstly, we note that housing outcomes are correlated with 
income level and occupational groupings, which supports class-analytic approaches.  The fact 
that housing outcomes appear to be correlated to labour market outcomes, raises the question 
of causality. It can be interpreted as housing outcomes reflecting capital-labour relations (as 
in Berry 1986). Yet, in line with Fessler and Schürz, housing outcomes may also reinforce 
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inequality through rent payments received by rentiers, capital gains and availability of 
housing capital and collateral. Second, homeownership is wide spread, which implies that 
substantial parts of the working classes are homeowner. This poses some challenges for 
Marxists approaches that originally conceived the working class without substantial wealth 
(and thus forced to sell their labour power), but makes arguments of class segmentations 
more relevant. Third, an open question is whether there is a real anchor for house prices (and 
thus capital gains) or whether they are driven by financial factors and speculative dynamics. 
From a Marxist viewpoint for increases in capital gains on real estate to occur, rents paid by 
tenants must rise faster than prices and wages. This implies a limit to how far property prices 
can rise and hence limits to housing based wealth accumulation. In contrast in the PK view, 
expectations about the future and credit availability are the key factors determining real estate 
prices. That implies that there is no real anchor, but cyclical speculative dynamics.  
In the course of the last boom the system pushed towards social limits. Strikingly, for private 
renters in the lowest two income deciles, net rent (excluding utility payments) constitutes 
41% and 37% of households’ disposable income respectively (Table 3).2 These figures 
increase to 57% and 45% when including utilities payments (Table A4). By contrast, outright 
owners spend only between 5% and 23% on housing related costs. Hence the implications of 
owning versus renting a home on household budget are substantial.  
 
Table 3 here 
                                                 
2 For this we base our calculations on the UK Living Costs and Food Survey, 2016-2017 (Department 





The challenge remains to establish antagonistic interests empirically not just conceptually. 
From the above we identify the following open empirical questions. Firstly, how does 
working class fragmentation play out in the workplace and how does it translate into political 
attitudes? Secondly, how do shifting class relations (working class fragmentation and 
strengthening of rentiers) correlate to macroeconomic aggregates, namely debt and 
consumption? How do the antagonistic interests between renters and rentiers play out 
politically and ideologically?  
Indeed, empirical scholarship on housing-related class interests is scarce. Emphasis, so far, is 
rather on discourse and social norms than capital-labour relations. Wood 2017 demonstrates 
that housing-related institutional shifts have created structural conditions that shape agency 
by transforming private home-ownership and mortgage-led accumulation into a dominant 
social norm in the UK. Hancock and Mooney (2013) show that the working class relying on 
social housing is stigmatised in the UK, their reliance on social housing said to be the 
consequence of irresponsible and disorderly behaviour, which serves to regulate and control 
working class communities.  
 
Conclusion 
So far housing has been given little consideration in the core of macroeconomics and political 
economy. This is despite growing evidence of the importance of housing for economic 
activity and in particular the central role of household and mortgage debt for financial crises. 
But even in normal, i.e. non-crisis times, housing related expenditures constitute a large 
amount of household budget and around half of residential investment. Housing has been 
28 
 
explored in subfields and academic niches. This paper has thus reviewed mainstream 
macroeconomics, PKE, Comparative Political Economy and Marxist Political Economy. For 
each of these we find some insight, but the balance between theoretical advances and 
empirical advances is uneven. Mainstream economics, because of its rationality and market 
clearing assumptions, has a limited ability to conceptually understand the dynamics 
emanating from real estate markets. Still it has provided a substantial amount of the empirical 
research on wealth effects and, more recently, evidence on financial cycles. PKE is much 
better positioned to analyse housing finance as it has endogenous money creation and 
financial instability at its core, but it has been slow to provide empirical applications. Political 
Economy approaches have also proceeded unevenly. Like mainstream economics the VoC 
approach is ill-suited to understand the complex dynamics arising from housing because of its 
focus on supply-side factors and competitiveness. However, other parts of Comparative 
Political Economy have advanced research on housing, inspired by the financialisation 
literature and PK analysis of growth models. It has also, with a heavy dose of institutionalism 
and economic history, motivated a comparative research on mortgage finance systems. 
Marxist Political Economy highlights rentierism and (intra)-class conflict. Using asset and 
wealth surveys in a class-relational approach can be a useful starting point in tracing power 
relations and the pervasiveness of antagonistic (intra)-class interests. For the UK, for 
instance, some 6% of households deriving on average as much as one fifth of their total 
annual income from rental payments. However the challenge lies firstly in defining 
theoretically grounded delineations when class boundaries are themselves unsettled and 
secondly in taking the class-relational approach to housing forward empirically, in particular 
linking potential housing-related class fragmentation to capital-labour relations as well as 
macroeconomic aggregates. 
Short, an adequate macroeconomics and political economy of housing remains to be 
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developed. It will have to build on PK macroeconomic theory to understand the debt 
dynamics emanating from the housing sector, but incorporate mainstream quantitative 
methods. Its impact is large, both on macroeconomic dynamics, where it has powerful 
influence on investment and consumption, but also on financial stability as mortgage debt 
constitutes most of household debt and an increasing share of bank balance sheets. House 
price dynamics tend to have a positive feedback on credit (as housing is used as collateral) 
and thus is prone to speculative bubble. Housing has a powerful impact on political dynamics 
in that it can shape identities and political preferences, political economy approaches finding 
negative correlations between homeownership and support for redistribution and social 
insurance as well as new housing development. It raises interesting questions for class 
analysis, as parts of the working classes do own their homes (often they also owe a lot of 
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weighted No. of observations 
(population size) 
% of total 
population 
Total 18,611 25,602,086 100.0% 
Renters 4,688 8,381,300 32.7% 
Owner-outright 7,467 7,835,424 30.2% 
Owner-mortgage 4,777 7,750,106 29.9% 
Rentiers 1,679 1,635,256 6.4% 






Table 2. Average income by tenure type 
 tot. inc.
i emp. inc.ii emp. inc. (ex. pen.)iii inc. rentiv inc. invst.v 
Renter 23,465 12,861 14,319 54 195 
Owner-mortgage 43,860 35,972 37,568 0 509 
Owner-outright 32,214 10,954 23,308 0 2,391 
Rentier 63,479 32,031 42,702 13,061 3,272 
i) Mean Household Total Regular Annual Income 
ii) Mean Household Annual Employment Income 
iii) Mean Household Annual Employment Income, excluding pensioners 
iv) Mean Household Annual Income from Rent 
v) Mean Household Annual Income from Investment 






Table 3. Net rent as share of normal household weekly disposable income, 2016-17 
Decile renter-private renter-social 
1 (poorest) 41% 13% 
2 37% 10% 
3 28% 13% 
4 24% 12% 
5 26% 14% 
6 26% 11% 
7 21% 13% 
8 19% 9% 
9 21% 9% 
10 (richest) 21% 5% 














Managerial & prof. occupations 22% 44% 56% 62% 
Intermediate occupations 18% 23% 19% 24% 
Routine & manual occupations 50% 32% 24% 13% 
Never worked/long term unemp. 7% 1% 0% 0% 
Not classified 3% 0% 1% 1% 
Calculations based on Wealth and Assets Survey, Wave 5, 2014-2016 
 
Table A2. Age distribution by tenure type 
Age band Renter Owner-outright Owner-mortgage Rentier 
16-24 4% 0% 0% 0% 
25-34 21% 1% 18% 8% 
35-44 20% 2% 30% 20% 
45-54 20% 9% 32% 24% 
55-64 13% 23% 14% 25% 
65-74 11% 31% 3% 17% 
75-84 7% 24% 1% 5% 
85+ 4% 9% 0% 2% 
Calculations based on Wealth and Assets Survey, Wave 5, 2014-2016 
 
Table A3. Tenure Types based on Living Cost and Food Survey 
Other 1.2% 
Owner mortgage 31.2% 
Owner outright  35.4% 
Renter-private  16.2% 
Renter-social  16.0% 





Table A4. Net housing costs/ normal weekly disposable income 
Decile private-renter renter-social owner-outright owner-mortgage 
1 57% 23% 23% 80% 
2 45% 17% 14% 27% 
3 38% 21% 13% 26% 
4 30% 20% 11% 18% 
5 33% 22% 10% 18% 
6 31% 17% 9% 16% 
7 27% 17% 8% 14% 
8 25% 13% 7% 13% 
9 26% 13% 6% 12% 
10 24% 9% 5% 13% 
Calculations based on UK Living Costs and Food Survey, 2016-2017 
 
 
 
